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CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT AND NATIONALISM:
HOBBES, LOCKE AND GEORGE LAWSON
Ethan Alexander-Davey1,2
Abstract: The emphasis in contemporary democratic theory and in the history of
political thought on the peculiarly abstract theory of popular sovereignty of Locke and
his twentieth-century intellectual descendants obscures a crucial relationship between
constitutional self-government and nationalism. Through a Hobbesian and Filmerian
critique of Locke and an examination of the political writings of George Lawson (a
seventeenth-century critic of Hobbes), the article shows the necessary connections
between popular sovereignty, constitutionalism and a form of national consciousness
that renders concrete the otherwise abstract and airy notion of the pre-political com-
munity to which government is to be held accountable, and, through a myth of national
origin, memories of native traditions of self-government, and stories of heroic ances-
tors who successfully defended those traditions against usurpers and tyrants, gives
substance to theories of constitutional government.
Keywords: George Lawson, Locke, Hobbes, Filmer, nationalism, consti-
tutionalism, popular sovereignty, English Civil War, the ancient constitution.
Introduction
The tradition of political theory that begins with Hobbes and Locke, and con-
tinues today with Rawls and Habermas and their innumerable followers, has a
blind spot, to which several theorists drew attention in the 1990s. That blind
spot is the question of nationhood and nationalism. The fact that ‘the nation’
is ignored by so many twentieth- and twenty-first century democratic theo-
rists very likely has something to do with the way prominent scholars of the
history of political thought have presented the development of modern politi-
cal thought, as a process that leads teleologically to John Locke’s natural
rights based theory of constitutional government. In this article I argue that
the political writings of George Lawson provide the key to understanding the
importance of national feelings, national memory and nationalist rhetoric in
making arguments for popular sovereignty tenable and in engendering popu-
lar attachment to particular constitutional forms.
As several scholars have shown, there is a logical and historical relation-
ship between constitutionalism and popular sovereignty on the one hand, and
nationalism on the other. I will illustrate this complex relationship through an
examination of the absolutist arguments of James I, Filmer and Hobbes, and
the English theory of constitutional self-government which George Lawson,
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CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT & NATIONALISM 459
following the example of such parliamentarians as Sir Edward Coke and John
Selden, formulated in response.3 In the literature, Lawson is typically regarded
as a sort of bridge ‘between Hobbes and Locke’ for he penned a lengthy
refutation of the work of the former and is said to have influenced the latter.4 I
find it useful to place Lawson between these two thinkers, but I do so not to
elucidate some aspect of their thought, but rather to show how Lawson’s
answer to Hobbes and other absolutists is more coherent than Locke’s, pre-
cisely because he buttresses his arguments for popular sovereignty and consti-
tutionalism with a well formulated concept of nationhood and with appeals to
England’s national past.5 The defenders of absolutism could easily demolish
arguments for constitutionalism and popular sovereignty based on the pre-
sumptive natural rights of individuals. But the appeal to England’s national
past was worrisome, especially to Hobbes, because this past contained evoca-
tive memories of ‘courageous’ and ‘free’ ancestors, who, thanks to their
national solidarity and their virtue, exercised a legislative power through Par-
liament and jealously guarded their rights and liberties. In short, Lawson suc-
cessfully answers the challenge posed by Hobbes, and provides a corrective to
the subsequent flawed formulations of Locke.
What I believe this examination demonstrates, more broadly, is that just as
popular sovereignty requires recourse to the nation as an historic community,
so does constitutionalism depend on reference to ancestral institutions. Both
are in a necessary relationship with the nation as an ‘inheritance’ shared by
members of the political community, a ‘heritage compounded of ethnic, politi-
cal, cultural and other elements’.6 To purify the people of particular national
attributes, to purify the institutions of their particular roots in historical mem-
ory, as Habermas and his disciples would have us do, risks dissolving those
bonds of national solidarity and constitutional discipline.
3 I do so for brevity and convenience. One would observe the same basic patterns in
an examination of the rise of constitutional self-government in the Netherlands, France
or even the United States. See Francois Hotman’s Francogallia for an early French argu-
ment for popular sovereignty and constitutionalism and Hugo Grotius’ Antiquity of the
Batavian Republic for a Dutch exemplar. The founding of the United States owed much
to the colonists’ memories of England’s national past. See T. Colbourn, The Lamp of
Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution
(Indianapolis, 1998).
4 See C. Condren, George Lawson’s Politica and the English Revolution (Cam-
bridge, 1989), pp. 173–95; J. Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty: Mixed
Monarchy and the Right of Resistance in the Political Thought of the English Revolution
(Cambridge, 1978), pp. 53–130; A.H. Maclean, ‘George Lawson and John Locke’, Cam-
bridge Historical Journal, 9 (1) (1947), pp. 69–77.
5 That is, England’s national past as he and other defenders of the ‘ancient liberties of
Englishmen’ understood it. The Whig version of history suffers very considerably under
the scrutiny of twentieth-century historiographical methods. See G. Sayles, The King’s
Parliament of England (New York, 1974).
6 M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham, 1996), p. 72.
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In Section I, I explain my use of the terms nationalism and constitutional
self-government in reference to the seventeenth century and briefly consider
the literature on the relationship between these two phenomena. In Section II,
I highlight the vulnerability of Locke’s formulation of the doctrine of popular
sovereignty to the critiques of Filmer, Hobbes and other absolutists. In Sec-
tion III, I discuss the nationalist ‘liberty’ narrative that worried Hobbes and
other absolutists, and served as a powerful rhetorical weapon in the hands of
proponents of constitutional self-government. In Section IV, I show how
Lawson’s theory of popular sovereignty overcomes the vulnerability of the
Lockean formulation, and answers the challenge of Filmer and Hobbes, by
appealing to the nation, a pre-political ethnic and religious community, as the
tie that binds individuals together in a polity. In Section V, I show how Law-
son strengthened his case for a particular constitutional settlement with
nationalist rhetoric and reference to landmarks from England’s past.
I
Nationalism and Constitutional Self-Government: Past and Present
It will perhaps be objected that the terms ‘nationalism’ and ‘self-government’
are not suitable for a discussion of the realities of seventeenth-century English
politics in general, or the political theory of George Lawson in particular. I
maintain that they are. Although the term ‘nationalism’ was coined in the
nineteenth century, many scholars argue that the phenomenon itself is much
older, that the general thesis advanced by Hobsbawm, Gellner and Anderson
is in fact a ‘modernist fallacy’.7 Others attempt to draw historical and norma-
tive distinctions between patriotism, or ‘civic nationalism’, and ethnic nation-
alism, but reality is generally messier than such typologies would suggest.8
What is more, many scholars make the case, pace Anderson, that England
should be regarded as the first modern nation, having emerged by the fifteenth
or the sixteenth century, and that nationalism was an especially potent force in
460 E. ALEXANDER-DAVEY
7 The chief works of the ‘modernists’ are E. Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism
since 1780 (Cambridge, 2012); E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithica NY, 1983);
B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (London, 2006). The ‘modernist fallacy’ is refuted
in several studies by Anthony D. Smith, especially The Ethnic Origins of Nations
(Oxford, 1988), Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge, 1995), and The
Cultural Foundations of Nations (Oxford, 2008); and by A. Hastings in The Construc-
tion of Nationhood (Cambridge, 2006).
8 For attempts to disaggregate ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’, see Maurizio Viroli,
For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism (Oxford, 1995); J.H.
Schaar, ‘The Case for Patriotism’, in J.H. Schaar, Legitimacy in the Modern State (New
Brunswick, 1981). The flaws in this approach are discussed in Canovan, Nationhood and
Political Theory; Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations; Rogers Smith, Stories of
Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership (Cambridge, 1999);
Bernard Yack, ‘Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism’, Political Theory, 29 (4) (2001).
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CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT & NATIONALISM 461
the broils of seventeenth-century English politics.9 Smith’s definition of
nationalism as ‘an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining
autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of a population’ is, as I will demon-
strate, certainly consistent with George Lawson’s aspirations, though it does
not fully encompass them.10 Lawson appeals for national unity and loyalty to
a particular Protestant and English order against those who would impose for-
eign constitutional models in church and state, specifically, those of the
papacy and continental European states.
If one wishes to speak of political reality in any century, even our own,
‘self-government’ is, admittedly, a problematic term. In a representative form
of government, the people, by definition, do not rule. Thus, some democratic
theorists have said that it is more accurate to call countries such as the UK or
US ‘polyarchies’ since political power is in fact shared by a small portion of
the population controlling different parts of government, and the degree of
accountability of government to each citizen is never truly equal.11 In fact,
Lawson often uses the term ‘polyarchy’ in the Politica, and, of the various
terms in his lexicon, it is this one that best fits his description of England’s tra-
ditional form of government in which power is vested conjointly in King,
Peers and Commons.12 This is not to say that England’s seventeenth-century
polyarchy and modern polyarchies are the same, but they are different merely
in degree, not in kind.13 Lawson was one of many seventeenth-century think-
ers who believed that England’s ‘ancient’ constitution was compatible with
the principle of self-rule. For, in his view, no law could be made or altered
without the consent of the House of Commons, which was understood —
limitations on the franchise notwithstanding — to represent the people.14
9 On England as the first modern nation, see Hastings, Construction of Nationhood;
and L. Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA, 1993). On
seventeenth-century English nationalism see, for instance, Smith, Cultural Foundations
of Nations, especially pp. 130–4; and A. Marx, Faith in Nation (New York, 2003).
10 Smith, Cultural Foundations of Nations, p. 15.
11 See, for instance, Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory: Expanded Edi-
tion (Chicago, 2006).
12 See Condren, Lawson’s Politica, p. 128. In Lawson’s depiction, he says, the gov-
ernment of England has the shape of a ‘polyarchal trinity’.
13 As a variety of social scientists have argued, the advent of universal suffrage and
the decline of old aristocracies notwithstanding, wealthy and powerful classes continue
to have a vastly disproportionate influence on politics in modern polyarchies. For
instance, see C.W. Mills, The Power Elite (New York, 2000); J. McCormick, Machiavel-
lian Democracy (Cambridge, 2011); J. Green, Liberalism and the Problem of Plutoc-
racy, unpublished paper presented at the UW-Madison Political Theory Workshop,
February, 2013.
14 Condren argues, contra Franklin, that Lawson can in no way be considered ‘demo-
cratic’, for in his theory of representation, government is not directly accountable to its
‘virtual’ members, that is, women, children, servants, strangers, tenants or vassals, or to
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The relationship between nationalism and constitutional self-government
tends to be underplayed in the work of prominent democratic theorists and
historians of political thought. As critics of the Rawlsian and Habermasian
schools have argued, constitutional self-government depends on many condi-
tions that only nationhood can provide, to wit: a sense of the extent of the
political community, a source of unity, solidarity and continuity transcending
common territory and shared procedures, and a clear image of the pre-political
community to which governments are accountable, and to which power reverts
when governments betray their trust.15 When one considers the historical
scholarship, one finds, at least in the more popular works of Skinner, Tuck and
Franklin, that George Lawson and other writers who made similar historically-
minded arguments dripping with nationalist rhetoric, are treated, in the main,
as precursors to John Locke and his universalist theory of human rights and
constitutional government based on rational consent to abstract principles.16
My claim is that the national-historical arguments of thinkers such as
George Lawson provided something fundamentally different, and something
more fundamentally important for the development of modern constitutional
462 E. ALEXANDER-DAVEY
other ‘irrational’ persons, that is, rebels and traitors, who might otherwise qualify as
‘full’ members of the polity. See C. Condren, ‘Resistance and Sovereignty in Lawson’s
Politica’, The Historical Journal, 24 (3) (1981), pp. 675–8. However, twentieth- and
seventeenth-century notions of ‘self-government’ are, properly speaking, different in
degree, not in kind. Modern democracies, after all, still exclude irrational or untrust-
worthy members such as children, convicts and foreigners from the franchise. In Law-
son’s theory ‘full’ and ‘eminent’ members of the community, that is, freeholders and
peers of the realm, have an active role in governing the nation. Lawson writes ‘in the
capacity and habitude of a Parliament, they are no subjects, but in the name of the people
have a Legislative power, and exercise the highest acts of Government, excepting those
of the Constitution’ (Examination, p. 59). Similarly, he asserts that whereas lords vote in
person, freeholders ‘virtually give their suffrage in that assembly [parliament] by their rep-
resentatives’ (Politica, p. 29). This order, according to Lawson, conforms to the model of a
‘free-state’. Even the radical Algernon Sidney argues that the English constitution, accord-
ing to which the king may not introduce or alter any law without the assent of the lords and
commons, is as consistent with the principle of self-government as the direct self-rule he
imagines to have taken place in the first Saxon communities that settled in England. See
A. Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government (Indianapolis, 1996), pp. 478–93.
15 See Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory; Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism
(Princeton, 1993); B. Yack, ‘Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism’, Political Theory, 29
(4) (2001); B. Yack, ‘The Myth of the Civic Nation’, Critical Review, 10 (2) (1996).
16 Q. Skinner, Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1978),
pp. 239–40, 318, 338; Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty, pp. 71–9,
94–7; Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cam-
bridge, 1982). Tuck does discuss Grotius’ use of the Batavian myth, as well as Selden and
Nathaniel Bacon’s use of the Anglo-Saxon myth in R. Tuck, Philosophy and Govern-
ment 1572–1651 (Cambridge, 1993), but even there these discourses are stops along the
way to the ‘great natural law theories of the mid-century’. Selden’s nationalism is most
visible in The English Janus (1610) as a whole, in the chapters on England in his more
famous Titles of Honor (1614), and in many of his speeches in the Commons.
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CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT & NATIONALISM 463
self-government. They did not merely provide better thinkers such as Locke
with material to construct their abstract theories. Nor did they endow individ-
uals with abstract human rights. In a sense, the texts of Lawson and others like
him rhetorically reconstituted mere ‘multitudes’ as ‘nations’. They were writ-
ten from the point of view of one ‘reminding’ his own people of something
‘forgotten’, that they were the descendants of ancestors who had possessed a
coherent political community, who had loved liberty and tolerated kings only
to the extent that the latter procured the common good and protected their lib-
erty as a people. Our ancestors constituted themselves as a people, and then
delegated certain authorities to kings and other magistrates. They had a settled
way of sharing the sovereign power of the nation among its various estates,
and they guaranteed their fellow subjects certain rights, which were under-
stood to inhere in them not as human beings, but as members of a particular
national community of common place, blood and custom.
II
The Problem with Locke
In the Second Treatise Locke makes a prodigious leap from the sovereign
rights of individuals in a state of nature to the sovereign right of a political
community. For him, a community is defined by the self-interest of its indi-
vidual members. It is created only for the protection of each individual’s life
and property. Its basis is an agreement of members to transfer their individual
right to execute the laws of nature to the group as a whole.17 According to
Locke, any multitude of individuals can form a community: ‘that, which
begins and actually constitutes any Political Society, is nothing but the
consent of any number of Freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorpo-
rate into such a society’.18 By defining a community in this way, Locke seems
to be thoughtlessly reopening the Pandora’s Box of cancerous factionalism
that Hobbes had sought to seal shut forever. According to this definition of
political society, or community, not even a minor interest group or faction
may be legitimately denied the right to form its own commonwealth. Any
voluntary association, capable of ‘concluding’ its members by a majority vote
on measures for the protection of their several lives and properties, can be said
to possess popular sovereignty.
17 Locke,TwoTreatisesofGovernment (Cambridge, 1994), SecondTreatise, p. 325, §89.
18 Ibid., p. 333, §99. James Tully treats the ‘political individualism’ of Locke and the
‘political holism’ or ‘collectivism’ of George Lawson as the most essential difference
between the two thinkers. He regards the former as an advance in the theory of popular
sovereignty, but does not consider the potential weaknesses of Locke’s individualism.
See J. Tully, ‘Current Thinking on Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Political Theory’,
Historical Journal, 24 (2) (1981), pp. 480–3; ‘Locke’, in The Cambridge History of
Political Thought 1450–1700, ed. J.H. Burns with the assistance of M. Goldie (Cam-
bridge, 1991), p. 622.
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As if anticipating Locke, Filmer, in The Anarchy of Mixed or Limited Mon-
archy (1648) writes:
Since nature hath not distinguished the habitable world into kingdoms, nor
determined what part of the people shall belong to one kingdom, and what
to another, it follows that the original freedom of mankind being supposed,
everyman is at liberty to be of what kingdom he please, and so every petty
company hath a right to make a kingdom by itself; and not only every city,
but every village, every family, nay, and every particular man, at liberty to
choose himself to be his own King if he please; and he were a madman that
being by nature free, would choose any man but himself to be his own gov-
ernor. Thus to avoid the having but of one King of the whole world, we shall
run into a liberty of having as many Kings as there be men in the world,
which upon the matter, is to have no King at all, but to leave all men to their
natural liberty, which is the mischief the pleaders for natural liberty do pre-
tend they would most avoid.19
As Filmer indicates, there is nothing in the doctrine of natural rights to define
the extent of the political community. Before one speaks of popular sover-
eignty, the question of demarcation must be answered. If one insists on start-
ing with a random multitude of completely independent and historically
unencumbered individuals, one has in fact a recipe for anarchy. Why should
this individual, that family or that city participate in any larger community,
submit to any larger constitutional discipline at all? Any ‘petty company’ may
declare itself sovereign at any time.
As Jeremy Rabkin notes in Law without Nations?, Locke shows at least a
vague awareness of this problem.20 In his reflections on the origin of govern-
ment in the Second Treatise he acknowledges ‘since then those, who liked one
another so well as to joyn into Society, cannot but be supposed to have some
Acquaintance and Friendship together, and some Trust one in another; they
could not but have greater Apprehensions of others, than of one another: and
therefore their first care and thought cannot but be supposed to be, how to
464 E. ALEXANDER-DAVEY
19 Sir Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Political Works (Oxford, 1949), p. 286.
Filmer was in fact responding to Philip Hunton’s Treatise of Monarchy (1643). It is per-
haps an unfair critique of that work, for Hunton actually grounds his argument for popu-
lar sovereignty and constitutionalism on the assumption, which he proceeds to demon-
strate, that England is a distinct nation, and that it has a long history as a constitutionally
limited monarchy. He begins the second (historical) part of his treatise thus: ‘Having thus
far proceeded in generall, before we can bring home this to a stating of the great
controversie . . . wee must first looke into the Frame and Composure of our Monarchy’
(italics added). See Hunton, A Treatise of Monarchy (Bristol, 2000), pp. 47 ff. But in
response to Locke the critique seems entirely justified.
20 According to Rabkin: ‘Revolution, in Locke’s account, is an act of the whole peo-
ple, or at least of most people, who must retain some coherence to establish a new gov-
ernment. So Locke says that political communities arise, in the first place, among those
with special affinities.’ J. Rabkin. Law without Nations?Why Constitutional Govern-
ment Requires Sovereign States (Princeton, 2005), p. 59.
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CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT & NATIONALISM 465
secure themselves against foreign Force’.21 Locke assumes that before there
can be government, there must be a multitude that is drawn together by ties of
acquaintance, friendship and mutual trust, which are internal to members of
the group, and opposed to the force of outsiders. But Locke and succeeding
generations of liberal theorists, buttressing their arguments as they do on uni-
versalist claims about human beings and human groups as such fail to tell us
anything substantive about the sources of friendship and mutual trust among
the members of particular polities or the factors that make one group of
human beings a polity distinct from other polities.
Hobbes well understood that if one could disprove the possibility of a
coherent pre-political community, the doctrine of popular sovereignty could
be eviscerated. In his various writings, he asserts that an entity such as ‘the
people’ can have no existence outside an instituted commonwealth. Before
there is a sovereign, or a state, there is no society, there is no people; there is
only a multitude of individuals. As Hobbes writes in On the Citizen, ‘prior to
the formation of a commonwealth a People does not exist, since it was not
then a person, but a crowd of individual persons’.22 For a people to exist as a
coherent whole, with common interests and common sentiments, the many
wills of the multitude, which lead each individual in a thousand different
directions, and mostly against one another, must be reduced to one will, that
of the sovereign. As Hobbes puts it in Leviathan: ‘A Multitude of men, are
made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, Represented . . .
For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that
maketh the Person One.’23 It is by their common obedience to one man, the
Sovereign, that the individuals of an otherwise chaotic, formless multitude
are constituted as a people. Without a Sovereign to forge their unity by substi-
tuting his will for all of their individual wills, they can have no common exis-
tence. Hobbes’s formulation of the theory of absolute monarchy is without
doubt the most radical in its reduction of the subjects of a kingdom to individ-
ual atoms who, before the establishment of a state, have no community at all
with others of their kind. Without the notion of a coherent pre-political com-
munity to support it, the doctrine of popular sovereignty can be turned upon
its head, and transformed into an argument for absolute monarchy. This is
indeed what Hobbes does in Chapter 18 of Leviathan, in which he explains the
origins of ‘commonwealths by institution’.
The Hobbesian formulation of absolutism is a late one. The older justifica-
tions of absolute monarchy deny not the existence, but the relevance of a pre-
political English community. The historical narrative offered by supporters of
the King throughout the seventeenth century refer to a single event, the
21 Locke, Two Treatises, p. 339, §107.
22 Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen (Cambridge, 2007), p. 95.
23 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge, 1994), p. 114.
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conquest of England in 1066 by William of Normandy.24 In the late sixteenth
century royalists begin to make use of the Norman Conquest in arguments jus-
tifying absolute monarchy. Rev. Dr. Adam Blackwood argues in his Apologia
pro Regibus (1581) that ‘William’s power after the Conquest was absolute,
and that any right which his conquered subjects retained in their property
thereafter was by his grace’. Blackwood compares the position of the English
to that of the American Indians after the Spanish conquest.25 King James I
himself writes in The Trew Law of Free Monarchies (1598):
For when the Bastard of Normandie [William I] came into England, and
made himself king, was it not by force, and with a mighty army? Where he
gave the Law, and tooke none, changed the Lawes, inverted the order of gov-
ernment, set downe the strangers his followers in many of the old possessours
rooms, as at this day well appeareth a great part of the Gentlemen of England
being come of the Norman blood, and their old laws, which to this day they
are ruled by, are written in his language, and not in theirs: and yet his
successours have with great happinesse enjoyed the Crowne to this day.26
In this view, then, William the Conqueror had acquired absolute power over
the English by his conquest, and the descendants of William all inherited this
absolute power. Supporters of the monarchy, such as Nicholas Ferrar, would
accept this theory, adding that the Anglo-Saxons had been dissolute, and that
the imposition of absolute rule upon them had been to their benefit.27
According to Foucault, Hobbes created his radical new formulation of the
theory of absolute monarchy primarily with a view to replacing earlier history-
based arguments that he thought were more vulnerable to critique.28 In
Hobbes’s view existing historical arguments are not only susceptible to
attack, they are also needlessly provocative. In the final chapter of Leviathan,
Hobbes criticizes those monarchs who use historical arguments to justify their
authority. It is unwise, he says, for them to
justifie the War, by which their Power was at first gotten, and whereon (as
they think) their Right dependeth, and not on the Possession. As if, for
example, the Right of Kings of England did depend on the goodnesse of the
cause of William the Conquerour, and upon their lineall, and directest
466 E. ALEXANDER-DAVEY
24 This, of course, was not the only justification of absolute monarchy. There were
also ‘designation theory’ and ‘patriarchalism’. See J. Sommerville, Politics and Ideol-
ogy in England, 1603–1640 (London, 1986). These theories too necessarily denied the
relevance of a pre-political English community.
25 C. Hill, ‘The Norman Yoke’, in Puritanism and Revolution (New York, 1970),
p. 61.
26 King James VI & I, Political Writings (Cambridge, 2006), p. 74.
27 Hill, ‘The Norman Yoke’, p. 62.
28 M. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France
1975–1976, trans. David Macey (New York, 2003), pp. 99, 111. Foucault surely over-
states his case when he claims that this was the chief impetus behind Hobbes’s formula-
tion of an original argument in favour of absolutism.
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Descent from him; by which means, there would perhaps be no tie of the
Subjects obedience to their Soveraign at this day in all the world: wherein
whilest they needlessely think to justifie themselves, they justifie all the
successefull Rebellions that Ambition shall at any time after raise against
them and their Successors. Therefore I put down for one of the most
effectuall seeds of the Death of any State, that the Conquerors require not
onely a Submission of mens actions to them for the future, but also an
Approbation of all their actions past; when there is scarce a Common-
wealth in the world, whose beginnings can in conscience be justified.29
Historical arguments, Hobbes well understood, are dangerous for monarchs.
In the English case, to assert the monarch’s right on the basis of a conquest
only reminds individuals that the power that now protects them was originally
established by the violent subjugation of their ancestors. Such a reminder
challenges all rebels to appeal to the lost honour of conquered ancestors and to
speak of a restoration of ancient rights lost at the time of the conquest. So as
not to provoke such dangerous imaginings, the monarch should emphasize
that his right to rule is based on his present possession of the power to protect.
The Hobbesian argument rejects history, viewing it as a Pandora’s box, and
appeals to the isolated individual’s present interest in enjoying the material
benefits of peace.
III
Tacitus, St Edward’s Laws and the Liberties of the English Nation
The Stuart kings themselves in their parleys with Parliament were never so
incautious as to assert their prerogative powers on the grounds of the right of
conquest. But they resorted of necessity to arguments that denied any particu-
lar rights and privileges to the English as a distinct nation. For instance, in
1610 James I declared before the House of Commons:
First therefore in the matter, all kings Christian as well elective as succes-
sive have power to lay impositions. I myself in Scotland before I came
hither, Denmark, Sweden that is but newly successive, France, Spain, all
have this power. And as Bellarmine abuses me in another sense solus rex
Angliae timet, so shall solus rex Angliae be confined?30 Besides to call in
question that power which all your kings have ever had, which 2 women
have had and exercised, I leave it to yourselves to think what dutiful sub-
jects ought to do in it.31
Here King James I asserts what he takes to be a general right of European
monarchs to tax their subjects without consent of parliament. If other kings
29 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 486.
30 The King of England alone fears [to lay impositions without consent of Parlia-
ment]. Shall the King of England alone be confined?
31 E. Foster, Proceedings in Parliament 1610: Vol. 2, House of Commons (New
Haven, 1966), p. 102.
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may do so, why is the King of England forbidden? Is he not like any other
Christian monarch? For good measure, James I buttresses his claim by citing
what he believes to be a precedent in English law.
Nicholas Fuller, MP for St Mawes, answered King James next day before
the whole House:
[T]hough the King were in truth very wise yet is he a stranger to this govern-
ment. He makes mention of this to be done in the time of 2 Queens. I
remember not any such thing, but that by a statute of tonnage and poundage
they had that they had . . . The King speaks of France and Spain what they
may do, I pray let us be true to the King and true to ourselves and let him
know what by the laws of England he may do.32
In this reply, Fuller grounds his argument on the distinctiveness of English
law, which James I, being a ‘stranger’ from Scotland, evidently does not
understand. The laws of Scotland, Spain, France and other nations are of no
consequence in this debate. According to the ancestral customs of England,
the only customs that matter here, the King may not lay impositions without
consent of Parliament. His Majesty misunderstands the precedent he cites, for
tonnage and poundage were collected by former kings of England only when
authorized by statute, that is, by an Act of Parliament. If the Common Law of
England is not taught up in Scotland, whence His Majesty hails, then we, the
elected representatives of the counties of England, are duty-bound to instruct
him on this point. Fuller’s reply to King James might be viewed as an opening
salvo in the seventeenth-century battle for sovereignty in England. The
nativist tone of the challenge is no accident.
Nicholas Fuller’s reply to King James contains at least a hint of a wider nar-
rative about the liberties of the English nation told in various forms by Sir
Edward Coke, John Selden and other parliamentarians of their time, and by
many other supporters of parliament throughout the century. The narrative
was that Englishmen were the descendants of Anglo-Saxon tribes from
Germany, whose courage, love of freedom, and tradition of self-government
by means of general assemblies had been noted by Tacitus in the Germania.
In England the government of this nation of Anglo-Saxons had evolved into a
mixed monarchy, in which King, Lords Temporal and Spiritual, and Com-
mons ruled the nation conjointly. This ‘ancient constitution’, in existence for
centuries, was codified by the last legitimate Saxon King, St Edward the
Confessor. In spite of various accounts asserting the contrary, William of
Normandy did not ‘conquer’ England, but rather accepted the English throne
on the condition that he rule in accordance with St Edward’s Laws. According
to many versions, the failure of William and his successors to keep this oath
occasioned many Saxon revolts, at the conclusion of which St Edward’s Laws
were restored. With their vigilance and, when necessary, their courage, many
468 E. ALEXANDER-DAVEY
32 Ibid., p. 109.
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generations of Englishmen had preserved St Edward’s Laws, the frame of
government prescribed by them, and the rights and privileges of subjects
codified in Magna Charta until the present time.33
This is the narrative that worried Hobbes, and other absolutists such as Rob-
ert Brady, who, in his Complete History of England (1685), complains that
we find nothing in our Common Histories of these Times, but the Brave
Feats performed by the English for their Fundamental Rights and Liber-
ties . . . Nothing in Sir Edward Coke, Mr Selden, Mr Prynne, and all late
Writers when they chop upon these Times, and mention anything relating to
them, but the Magnanimity of the English in Appearing for their Birth-
rights, and the great Privileges they had formerly injoyed.34
Such a telling of English history was dangerous because it made the defence of
liberty and self-government a matter of English national pride and duty to
ancestors. Present absolutist pretensions are thus an affront to all generations of
Englishmen. Throwing off that yoke is a duty owed not only to the present gen-
eration, but also to ancestors and to posterity. In this way, says Foucault, ‘the
justification for rebellion becomes a sort of historical necessity, once national
phenomena become part of the discourse’.35 Not only does the justification for
rebellion become a historical necessity, but also the preservation of a particular
form of government, and the protection of particular national rights.
All of the above is missing from Locke’s account of popular sovereignty
and constitutionalism. Locke is unique among seventeenth-century English
political writers in making no appeal to the English national past.36 Moreover, as I
have shown, he formulates no clear concept of nationhood. George Lawson, on
the other hand, posits nationhood as such, and a historically rooted tradition of
constitutional self-government — such as he believed generations of English-
men had struggled to preserve — as necessary preconditions for popular sov-
ereignty and constitutionalism. His works, moreover, take for granted the
nationalist narrative I describe above, and use it to good effect. This is indeed
what makes his argument coherent and persuasive. Lawson’s argumentation
33 To gain a sense of the pervasiveness of this narrative and its various permutations
see Janelle Greenberg, The Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution: St. Edward’s
‘Laws’ in Early Modern Political Thought (Cambridge, 2001); J. Pocock, The Ancient
Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the 17th Cen-
tury, a Reisssue with a Retrospect (Cambridge, 1987); The Roots of Liberty: Magna
Charta, Ancient Constitution, and the Anglo-American Tradition of Rule of Law, ed.
E. Sandoz (Indianapolis, 1993); C. Weston, ‘England: Ancient Constitutional and Com-
mon Law’, in The Cambridge History of Political Thought, ed. Burns, pp. 374–411.
34 Quoted in J. Reid, ‘The Jurisprudence of Liberty: The Ancient Constitution in the
Legal Historiography of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, in The Roots of Lib-
erty, ed. Sandoz, p. 270.
35 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p. 110.
36 Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, p. 237.
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shows with great clarity the necessary relationship between constitutional
self-government and nationalism.
IV
George Lawson on Nationhood and Popular Sovereignty
Locke cannot help us understand the sources of mutual trust and friendship
that bind the pre-political community together. George Lawson can, for he
defines ‘community’ very differently from Locke, and he does so very likely
because of his engagement with Hobbes. The notion of a pre-political com-
munity is present in both of Lawson’s political works, the Examination and
the Politica, but it is given a more substantial formulation in the latter.37
According to Condren, Lawson’s move away from a simple contract theory
and his increased emphasis on the substantive bonds of the pre-political union
in the later work may well have been elicited by ‘Hobbes’s devastating treat-
ment of the logic of contract in Leviathan’.38 To preserve the notion of politi-
cal accountability, the pre-political community needed shoring up, both as a
concept and as a concrete historical and political reality.
Thus, in defining a‘community’ Lawson gives an abstract definition, bor-
rowed from the continental sources he knew, but then provides a concrete
definition for the particular case he wishes to address, that is, the case of Eng-
land. He quotes approvingly Johannes Forsterus’ definition of the Hebrew
word ’am: ‘a multitude of people or society, which being joined together have
the same name, language, laws, religion, polity’.39 The definition is not per-
fect for his purposes, Lawson himself notes, for a pre-political community, by
definition, is not yet a ‘polity’. The essential point is that the pre-political
community is not just an aggregate of individuals inhabiting the same space.
Pace Hobbes, a multitude of individuals does not miraculously become a
community when its members agree to establish a sovereign over them. As
Lawson says in the Examination ‘[t]his community must be associated and
united not only in vicinity of place, which is convenient, but also in some
stricter bond’.40 A common name, language, laws and religion may form a
multitude into a community, or it may not. But these are the sorts of things that,
when held in common, generally distinguish communities from mere multi-
tudes. For a genuine community capable of establishing its own government to
470 E. ALEXANDER-DAVEY
37 The editions of the two Lawson texts used here are as follows: G. Lawson, Politica
Sacra et Civilis, ed. C. Condren (Cambridge, 2006) (hereafter Politica); G. Lawson, ‘An
Examination of the Political Part of Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan’, in Leviathan: Contem-
porary Responses to the Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes, ed. G.A.J. Rogers (Bristol,
1995) (hereafter Examination).
38 C. Condren, ‘Confronting the Monster; George Lawson’s Reactions to Hobbes’s
Leviathan’, Political Science, 40 (1) (1988), p. 73.
39 Politica, p. 23.
40 Examination, p. 18.
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exist, the members ‘must associate and be united together; for they make up
this body, not severally considered, but as joined together in one; for Genus is
a society. This society first pressupposeth union, and is a communion,
whereby they communicate in something common to the whole; as in an
organical body, there are many members.’41 Lawson should perhaps not be
faulted for being rather vague here. In reality, it is hard to specify what it is
that makes a community a community. For Lawson, only a community whose
members have a sense of belonging to things common to them all, who have
cares that transcend the particular interests that concern each of them sever-
ally, has potential to establish its own government. The description of the
community as an ‘organical body’, that is, of one ‘Genus’, is suggestive of the
idea of a common ethnic origin. The language of communion suggests a reli-
gious bond. Indeed, in his remarks on England, Lawson says that his national
community has two focal points: the English interest and the Protestant Chris-
tian interest. Englishness and Protestantism, attachment of all members to the
‘substance’ of these things, are what make the inhabitants of England a com-
munity. The pre-political community thus has two guises: it is a community of
blood and custom, and a community of faith. This is the foundation. Those
other elements that one finds in Lawson’s conception of community that
Locke later privileges, to the exclusion of all others, to wit ‘propriety of
goods, liberty of persons, equality of the members’ are for Lawson the ‘ad-
juncts of a community’.42 Members of a community acknowledge the rights of
fellow members to these things, but such rights are not the foundation of the
community as Locke would have us believe.
It may be possible for almost any diverse or barbarous multitude to have
some sort of government, but the nearer affection of members of the same
community for each other is essential if a people is to enjoy self-government,
if it is to govern itself as what Lawson calls a ‘free state’. Lawson reiterates,
the ‘fitness, capacity, and immediate disposition to a form of civil govern-
ment doth not arise so much from the multitude of the persons, or extent and
goodness of the place of their habitation, but from their good affections one
towards another’.43 Where these affections, this union and communion are
lacking, a free state is not possible. In his Epistle to the reader, Lawson notes
the divisions among the English nation: ‘Men of English blood, and of the
same Protestant profession continue obstinate in their errors, rigid and high in
their opinions, resolved in their different designs, admire their own models of
government in church and state’.44 Writing as he was in the final years of the
Protectorate, he finds the interests, affections and judgments of Englishmen
so disparate ‘that the same language, laws, religion, common country cannot
41 Politica, p. 24.
42 Ibid., p. 29.
43 Ibid., p. 25.
44 Ibid., p. 4.
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firmly unite us together; but we are ready every moment to fly asunder and
break in pieces, if we were not kept together rather by the sword of an army,
than by any civil power and policy, or good affection’.45 The concept that
Lawson is grappling with here, homogeneity, is a tricky one, and he clearly
understands the difficulties of it. The fact of common blood, laws, religion
and country, supposing it could be objectively verified, is no guarantor of
unity. The people have to acknowledge and value such commonalities; to
perceive themselves as one nation, and desire cooperation with their fellow
countrymen. If they cannot acknowledge and make a priority of the things
they share, then they cannot rule themselves through a ‘civil policy and good
affection’. The only answer for a community that has lost its spirit of ‘union
and communion’, or a mere multitude that has no internal sources of union, is
rule by the sword. This, of course, was Hobbes’s answer to the problem of dis-
unity, which he thought endemic to all human populations.
For a community to be prior to the state, and to demand that the state serve
the common good, said community must be a nation, whose members have
care for one another and for the community they share, care based on per-
ceived ties of kinship, language, religion, customs and laws. It is this sort of
‘community civil considered abstractively and antecedently to a form of gov-
ernment not yet introduced, or upon a dissolution of a former model, or upon a
failure of succession in a time doth virtually contain a supreme power, and
hath liberty and right to determine upon what form they please, so that it be
good’.46 Lawson’s theory of sovereignty grants the community supreme
power to determine the form of government it prefers. But the theory can
make sense only if it can indeed be asserted that, of the two entities, commu-
nity and government, only the former is a permanent body. Regardless of the
state of the government, ‘any community . . . retains the nature of a commu-
nity, as the matter and subject of the commonwealth, wherein every subject
must be considered, first as a civis, a member of the community, before he can
be conceived, as subditus, a member of the commonwealth’.47 The commu-
nity is antecedent to the state, and it continues to exist with its own bonds of
membership, regardless of the condition of the state, whether it has grown
despotic or is in abeyance. Membership in the community (the nation) is per-
manent, whereas membership in the state, which we today call citizenship, is
a contingent membership, which may be dissolved.
When Lawson applies his concepts to England, it becomes clear that by
‘community’ he means the English nation.48 He establishes the sovereignty of
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45 Ibid., p. 26.
46 Ibid., p. 30.
47 Ibid.
48 He sometimes uses other terms, such as ‘country’, ‘native country’ or ‘commu-
nity’, instead of nation, but the underlying notion is the same. Lawson uses the terms
country, community, nation as interchangeably as do modern journalists and politicians.
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
13
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
the English people, independent of kings and parliaments, by looking back to
the time before these organs of government were instituted. But this ‘time
before’ is neither a Hobbesian nor a Lockean state of nature. In his refutation
of Leviathan, Lawson dismisses Hobbes’s ‘covenant of every one with every
one for to design a Sovereign’ as ‘but an Utopian fancy’ and ‘a chimera’.49 He
probably would have regarded Locke’s abstract theory of the social contract
with similar contempt. A multitude of individual atoms with nothing in com-
mon other than a generic capacity to reason and a desire for ‘peace and plenty’
would not have sufficient unity to join together for the establishment of a
national government.50 However, a multitude of men of the same ‘genus’,
who share ancestral customs, who see themselves as one nation, would; and
this, he asserts, was indeed the case: ‘there was indeed a time, even after the
Saxons were settled in this nation, when there was no king, but forty lords,
who at length chose a king which should have no peer . . . And after that we
find one king and parliaments, and this before the Conquest’.51 Here stands
the pre-political English community, the English nation, a distinct body of
men of common blood and custom, whose existence was denied by Hobbes
and strangely forgotten by Locke: forty Anglo-Saxon lords representing forty
counties of Angle-land, who had sufficient unity of purpose to elect a king and
to govern jointly with him in parliaments. Modern historiography may tell us
it is mythical, but it did not seem so in Lawson’s time. In any event, a pleasing
myth about one’s ancestors, for which some scraps of evidence can be pro-
duced, is always better than a dull philosophical abstraction.
This idea of a coherent pre-political body of men united by blood and cus-
tom before the establishment of a civil government is analogous to the body of
Christian believers united by common doctrine and worship before the estab-
lishment of an ecclesiastical government. Brian Tierney has shown that for
Lawson, as for many of the political thinkers who precede him, church and
state are ‘analogous’ institutions. Lawson combines secular and religious
ideas in his conceptualization of civil and ecclesiastical constitutions. It is
also certainly true that in Lawson’s conception the nation and the ecclesia are
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49 Examination, pp. 24, 29. According to Condren, Lawson ‘naively’ misreads
Hobbes’s contract theory ‘as an empirical one’. Condren, ‘Confronting the Monster’,
p. 72. However, one could just as well credit Lawson for having the good sense to dismiss
a political theory based on a mere thought experiment.
50 Lawson begins his refutation of Hobbes with this statement: ‘To think that the sole
or principal Cause of the constitution of a civil State is the consent of men, or that it aims
no further than peace and plenty, is too mean a conceit of so noble an effect’, Examina-
tion, p. 16.
51 Politica, p. 99. See also the Examination, p. 42, for a more explicitly contractarian
account of the founding of the English state by the forty Saxon lords. Lawson’s source for
this was the Mirror of Justices, considered by some seventeenth-century antiquaries to
be late medieval forgery, which indeed it was, but was embraced as historical truth by Sir
Edward Coke.
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analogous pre-political communities.52 Lawson writes: ‘Many of the primi-
tive Christians, after their conversion continued for a certain time without any
set form of external government, or perfect rules of New Testament worship,
except to word and prayer, was settled. Hence those words of the Apostle,
“the rest will I set in order when I come” (1 Cor. 11. 34).’53 The first body of
Christian believers existed as a coherent community before any institutional
structure had been erected. This historical fact confirms Lawson’s theoretical
claim that a Christian community is, properly speaking, prior to any ecclesias-
tical government, for ‘the matter is before the form’.54 The same may be said,
Lawson tells us, of England as a whole, for England is a Christian nation: ‘A
community of Christians may be said to be national . . . in several respects: As
when all the Christians of one and the same nation, do associate and unite in
one body; when these Christians are the major part of the people; when the
whole nation, or the generality thereof have received and do profess the same
Christian faith.’55 This ‘same Christian faith’ which the ‘major part’ or the
‘generality’ of Englishmen profess is ‘the substance of the Protestant reli-
gion’ which consists not ‘merely in a separation from the church of Rome . . .
(for this is but negative); but in certain positives of doctrine, worship and dis-
cipline clearly agreeable to the gospel’.56
The existence of a concrete, historical pre-political community is the foun-
dation of Lawson’s argument that governments, both civil and ecclesiastical,
are held in trust. Regarding England’s civil government, he can assert: ‘That
form of government was first constituted by the community of England, not
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52 B. Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought (Cambridge,
1982), pp. 97–102.
53 Politica, p. 205.
54 Ibid., pp. 36–7. Condren argues that Lawson’s reflections on the church as a
‘matter’ existing before ‘form’ are the source of his theory of the nation as a continuous
community existing prior to the state and after its dissolution, suggesting that the
ecclesiological analogy is more coherent than the idea of a Saxon nation existing prior to
the English civil constitution. See C. Condren, ‘Sacra before Civilis’, Journal of Reli-
gious History, 11 (2) (1981), pp. 528–9. It is worth noting, however, that the notion of an
Anglo-Saxon nation existing prior to the state was already a well-worn trope by Law-
son’s time. John Selden in his Jani Anglorum (1610) speaks of the Germanic tribes who
peopled England as a single ‘Saxon’ nation. Philip Hunton (1643) and Nathaniel Bacon
(1647) also speak of a secular self-governing Saxon nation which accepted the rule of
kings on trust and deposed them for tyranny. See Tracts Written by John Selden of the
Inner-Temple, Esquire (London, 1683), p. 29; Hunton, Treatise of Monarchy, pp. 52 ff.;
Nathaniel Bacon, An Historical Discourse of the Uniformity of the Government of Eng-
land (London, 1647), pp. 47–50. It is safe to say in any case that Lawson’s religious and
secular notions of pre-political communities are mutually reinforcing, and that it is
thanks to his ability to draw these analogies that his formulations are clearer and more
thoughtful than those of earlier and later writers (such as Locke) who did not.
55 Politica, p. 203.
56 Ibid., p. 217.
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by a parliament, much less by a sovereign king. For the community and peo-
ple of England gave both king and parliament their being.’57 Since the com-
munity of England is the original source of sovereignty, reasons Lawson, the
nation alone has the right to alter the constitution: ‘if they [king and parlia-
ment] meddle with the constitution to alter it, they destroy themselves,
because they destroy that whereby they subsist’.58 The English nation thus
possesses what would later be called ‘constituent power’, the power to establish
a constitution by which it may be governed. This is the sense of Lawson’s asser-
tion that only the community of England has ‘real majesty’ or sovereignty. Per-
sonal majesty is given by the people to King and Parliament in trust:
Personal majesty [is] fixed in some persons, who are trusted with the exer-
cise of it, and may, and many times do forfeit to God, and in some cases for-
feit it to the community or the people . . . The person or persons trusted with
the majesty and power are bound to seek the good of the whole people, and
for that end they are trusted with it, and no otherwise.59
King and Parliament exercise the power of the nation in trust. If the King and
Parliament fail to keep their trust, they forfeit their power to the nation, the
ultimate repository of sovereignty. Similarly, England’s ecclesiastical gov-
ernment is held in trust from the community of Protestant believers, which
proposition Lawson asserts by way of an analogy to the state. Just as the ‘chief
power’ is reserved in the ‘whole community’ so that ‘if the trustees do abuse
their power, they may remove them or reform them: so it should be done in the
church’.60
One of Lawson’s chief aims in writing Politica Sacra et Civilis was to
establish on philosophical and historical grounds the power and the right of
the people to appoint a Concilium sapientum or Convention Parliament to
restore the English constitution that had been so badly marred as a conse-
quence of the Civil War.61 Unlike Locke, however, he understood implicitly
that such a power could have no reality in the absence of an established com-
munity, to which the power could indeed revert. To ground his argument
Lawson could provide ‘evidence’ from national history, and by analogy to the
history of the church, that the English were a nation whose members had in
ancient times coalesced of their own accord to form a government. This com-
munity, with these racial, cultural and spiritual bonds, and these ancient tradi-
tions of government may reframe its civil and ecclesiastical constitutions for
the common benefit, as it has done before. But as his more general reflections
on the nature of the communal bond suggest, such a demonstration would not
57 Ibid., p. 108.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., p. 49.
60 Ibid., p. 175.
61 This is the main focus of Franklin’s discussion of Lawson in John Locke and the
Theory of Sovereignty.
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be sufficient by itself. For the people must actually care about and be prepared
to make a priority of the fundamental ‘matter’ or ‘substance’ of their union.
Thus, Lawson’s argument is also grounded in a moral appeal for national
unity for the sake of those collective interests. He writes:
In all our sad divisions which happened from first to last, and are not wholly
yet ended to this day, two things are worthy the serious consideration of
wiser men than I am: What party for time past hath been most faithful to the
English interest; and what course is to be taken for to settle us more firmly
for time to come. For the first, we must understand what the English interest
is. The English interest is twofold, civil and ecclesiastical; for we are Eng-
lishmen and Christians. The civil interest is salus populi Anglicani . . . The
interest ecclesiastical is the Protestant religion and the preservation of the
substance thereof.62
A community that is to resolve its internal differences and reframe its consti-
tution for the benefit of all must be able to unite around a common English and
Protestant interest that trumps all factional and denominational interests.
Reinforcing this point he says: ‘Let no man think that the public interest,
either ecclesiastical or civil, of England is the interest of any one person or
family, or any few persons or family, much less any sect, party, faction.’63
Individual and factional differences must be overcome by shared nationhood,
rooted in a shared history, both civil and ecclesiastical.
Thus, on Lawson’s account, the concept of popular sovereignty is senseless
without a concept of nationhood. According to Locke’s theory of sovereignty,
the constituent power could be claimed by any of the factions with preten-
sions to forming their own community. Both Filmer and Hobbes identify the
problem with this argument. Locke never addresses their valid objections;
and, indeed, his theory of popular sovereignty makes it impossible for him to
answer them. Lawson, however, can answer Filmer and Hobbes. In his con-
ception, popular sovereignty is firmly rooted in attachments men feel to their
native country. As Lawson expresses it ‘every subject is first bound to be
faithful to their Countrey, then unto their King, who swears to maintain the
Laws, Liberty and Religion by Law established’.64 When one makes such a
concept foundational, one assumes ‘a higher obligation of fidelity, not only to
God, but their own native country, to which they are to be faithful under any
form of government or personal sovereign whatever’.65 Where there is no
genuinely felt national community to which individuals and factions are will-
ing to sacrifice their particular interests, one must turn to Hobbes for a solu-
tion, or let the factions go their separate ways.
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62 Politica, p. 112.
63 Ibid., p. 123.
64 Examination, p. 26.
65 Politica, p. 64.
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V
Lawson on Constitutionalism and the Liberties of Englishmen
One cannot argue for popular sovereignty without appealing to the nation as
an established community with certain civil and sacred interests. Similarly,
one cannot advocate a particular form of constitutional discipline, and
particular rights to be protected by that constitution, on the basis of mere
abstract principles as Locke attempts to do in The Second Treatise. In this case
too, Lawson, like most defenders of English liberty of his time, appeals to
landmarks in the nation’s past, and to the sacred memory of heroic ancestors
who fought for English liberties. For Lawson, ‘modern’ principles such as
government by the consent of the governed, protection of individual rights,
the division of sovereign power, all have their origin in England’s ancient
past, all are components of ‘this model of ours [which] began in the time of
the Saxon kings, and was brought to perfection, some say before; some say, in
Edward the Confessor’s time’.66
The fundamental cause of conflict in the Civil War was, as Lawson saw
it, disagreement concerning the form of civil and ecclesiastical government in
England. Lawson does not attempt in his work to sort out all the particulars,67
but he does endeavour to re-establish a consensus on the fundamentals of
England’s ‘ancient constitution’. There are significant differences between
the Examination and the Politica owing to the different circumstances in
which they were written.68 In the first, Lawson’s task is to repudiate absolut-
ism, in the second, to encourage his countrymen to put aside partisanship and
seek national reconciliation. Yet, the same spirited, and sometimes intemper-
ate advocacy of English liberty prevails in both. In making this case, he
employs a very familiar narrative and form of rhetoric. On the liberties of the
subject, and the constitutional limits on the power of King and Parliament,
Lawson admits no compromise. In the Examination, he states bluntly: ‘For
the English alwaies desired to be governed as men, not as Asses.’69 In
the Politica, he frequently condemns advocates of any form of absolutism as
‘ignorant’, ‘foreign’ or both — such opinions contrary to English liberty, he
says, ‘we Englishmen cannot well brook’.70
Unlike Locke, Lawson defends not the rights of individuals, but the rights
of Englishmen. Lawson’s Englishman looks backward to his heroic
ancestors, and sees in them, and in their example, the best protection of his
66 Ibid., p. 99.
67 He had done so in another work which he was prepared to release after gauging the
reception of the Politica, but the Restoration beat him to it. That work is now lost. See
Condren, Lawson’s Politica.
68 Condren catalogues the differences in ‘Confronting the Monster’, pp. 71–4 and
Lawson’s Politica, pp. 95–116.
69 Examination, p. 42.
70 Politica, p. 103.
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freedoms. ‘English liberty’, he says, ‘is their birthright’. ‘We do not learn it
out of the Greek and Roman Histories, nor from the Athenians or Romans, but
from our own laws, which are far different from theirs, and far more agreeable
to the written laws of God.’71 It has been the Englishman’s understanding of
his own native laws, agreeable to God and derived to him by right of birth, that
has enabled him to preserve his own rights as a subject, and the right of his
nation as a collective to rule itself. This, Lawson asserts, has been the case
throughout English history. He says ‘most of those who have controlled the
just acts of sovereigns, never read, much less understood, those [Greek or
Roman] authors’.72 Englishmen know their rights from ‘the original constitu-
tion of the state, Magna Charta, the Laws, and the Petition of Right’.73
Throughout English history, Englishmen have been a people zealous for lib-
erty, and have fought to preserve the rights won for them by their ancestors:
‘much more the English liberty is to be valued, and ever was by our ancestors,
who obtained it, recovered it, kept it, though with the blood of many thou-
sands’.74
Lawson thus describes Englishmen as a nation apart, favoured by God and
distinguished from others precisely by the special powers, rights and privi-
leges they have inherited from their ancestors:
The liberty of the subjects of this Nation is very great, and such . . . [that] the
ordinary and common subjects of other Nations are but slaves unto them.
Our Freeholders have the choice of their Knights and Burgesses for the Par-
liament, so that neither any Laws can be made, nor moneys imposed upon
them, without their verbal consent, given by their Representatives. In all
causes, civil, criminal, capital, no Judgement can pass against them but by
the verdict of a jury made up of their neighbours, which in itself is an excel-
lent priviledge.75
Compared to English freeholders, the common subjects of other nations are
little better than ‘slaves’. England’s ancient constitution provides members of
the nation with the power to participate in lawmaking through their represen-
tatives in Parliament and protects their freedom as individuals through the
institution of trial by jury of one’s peers.
The ancient constitution of England not only empowers the common peo-
ple and guarantees their individual liberties, it also limits the power of the
three estates that compose the government. The power of the Kings of Eng-
land is strictly limited by the constitution, and has been so since the begin-
ning. In the Examination, Lawson declares with gusto that any King of
England who claims absolute power by right of conquest may be deposed by
478 E. ALEXANDER-DAVEY
71 Ibid., p. 60.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., p. 58.
74 Ibid., p. 55.
75 Ibid.
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force. Following other writers who made much of the right of conquest, Law-
son insists that English law does not recognize such a right, and that English-
men have never before suffered any ruler to treat them as a vanquished nation:
What William the Conqueror here in England did, it matters not much. For
if he did derive his title from Edward the Confessor . . . then he was no
Soveraign. If he did act as Conqueror, then all compact and right upon
covenant is void, as his successors, who insist upon that title of conquest,
give full liberty to the English to fight against them, and depose them if they
can and deal with them as enemies.76
In the Politica, Lawson avoids any direct assertion of a right of resistance, but
he emphasizes the constitutional limits on the power of the king, and offers
the phenomenon of Englishmen curbing tyrannical kings as a fact of English
history. An English king, he says, has ‘no power of the purse’. He is sworn to
‘corroborate the just laws and customs, which the people had chosen’. In the
parliament, he is the third party, and ‘neither in acts of laws or judgement’ can
‘he do anything without the peers and commons . . . As kings have sometimes
curbed parliaments, so parliaments have kings, and disposed of the militia, the
navy, the ports, the chief offices. Nay, sometimes they have judged kings,
accusing them of acting against the fundamental constitution, and challenging
such power as tended to the dissolution of the same, and have deposed
them.’77
The English Parliament, composed of Commons and Peers, though it pos-
sesses very great authority, is also limited by the fundamental laws of the
nation, and always has been so. For instance, no parliament can forbid future
parliaments to repeal its acts and judgments. What is more, no mere parlia-
ment can alter the constitution of the kingdom, for the constitution prescribes
parliament’s powers as well as those of the king. ‘They cannot alter the gov-
ernment, nor take away divers things belonging to the crown, because they
did not give the prerogatives of the crown at first.’78 Both King and Parliament
may overstep their bounds, in which case the obedience of the subjects of the
realm is no longer due them:
The personal majesty of a king with us, whilst he lives, and governeth
according to law, requires subjection, but . . . upon tyranny in exercise, or
acting to the fundamental dissolution of the constitution, he ceaseth to be a
sovereign, and the obligation as to him ceaseth. A parliament turning into a
faction, acting above their sphere, wronging king or people, cannot justly
require, nor rationally expect for subjection.79
76 Ibid., p. 70.
77 Ibid., p. 57.
78 Ibid., p. 107.
79 Ibid., p. 226.
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An English king who rules tyrannically, without regard to law or the consti-
tution, ceases to be a king. Likewise, a Parliament that oversteps its constitu-
tional authority, or becomes a faction that does not genuinely represent the
interests of the nation as a whole, also loses the authority to demand obedi-
ence to its laws. Lawson says that such a Parliament as this may be called to
account and judged by later Parliaments.
In the Politica Lawson propounds the coordination thesis, which he some-
times calls ‘polyarchical sovereignty’.80 According to the ancient constitu-
tion, such powers as the three estates of the realm have, they possess jointly,
and only on condition that they, as representatives of the nation, pursue the
common good. Says Lawson: ‘The personal majesty primary was in king,
peers, and commons jointly: in the whole assembly as one body.’81 This is
confirmed by the traditional manner of enacting legislation in England: ‘Be it
therefore enacted by the King’s most excellent Majesty, by and with the
assent and consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal, and by the Commons
in this present Parliament assembled, and by authority of the same.’82 The par-
ticular genius of this arrangement, according to many English writers who
precede and follow Lawson, is that, as no law could be passed without the
consent of all three estates, King, Peers and Commons, the interests of the
whole realm must be taken into account, and the exorbitances of one portion
of the nation could be checked and moderated by the others.83 On the authority
of Sir Edward Coke, the antiquary Henry Spelman and the Modus tenendi
Parliamentum, Lawson affirms that this coordinated legislative power of the
estates can be traced back to the Saxons.
Unlike the papacy, which Lawson characterizes variously as absolutist,
foreign and even Satanic, England’s ancient ecclesiastical government resem-
bles its civil government in that it, too, is polyarchical, disposing power to dif-
ferent authorities to be exercised jointly by them all.84 Lawson begins by
drawing upon secular theories of the state and the history of the church to jus-
tify this claim. Christ said ‘tell the church’, thus, the power of the keys is not
‘in it monarchically, nor aristocratically, nor democratically, or any pure way
480 E. ALEXANDER-DAVEY
80 The English constitution fits Lawson’s category of ‘polyarchical sovereigns who
are many physically, but considered as one person morally, as jointly invested with one
power sovereign’ (Politica, p. 54). On the coordination thesis, see C.C. Weston and J.R.
Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns: The Grand Controversy over Legal Sovereignty in
Stuart England (Cambridge, 1981).
81 Politica, p. 108.
82 Ibid., p. 110.
83 See Hunton, A Treatise of Monarchy, pp. 42–3. Hunton emphasizes the theme of
checks and balances, which he argues was one of the advantages of England’s mixed
monarchy.
84 On the absolutist, foreign and Satanic character of the papacy, see Chapter 9 of the
Politica. See also Condren, Lawson’s Politica, p. 82.
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of disposition; but in the whole, after the manner of a free state or polity’.85
Bishops of the primitive church, he says, did not act without the assent of
presbyters and people. Considering the history of the church more broadly,
bishops in many nations were advised by presbyters, but not bound by their
advice, yet ‘the English bishop is something different from all these’.86 Thus,
Lawson also points to an authentically English ecclesiastical order, quite
unlike the episcopal absolutism that had arisen in foreign nations. The English
episcopacy he describes as ‘singular’, unique in two respects: its power of
ordination was shared with presbyters, and it made canons with the assent not
only of presbyters, but also of king and parliament, which represented the
people.87 Says Lawson, ‘the canons and injunctions made by the clergy,
though confirmed by royal assent, without the parliament have been judged of
no force’.88 The best form of government for the national church is thus a
combination of primitive Christian and peculiarly English elements, that is a
division of power between, on the one hand, a convocation of bishops, pres-
byters and people — like the ancient convocations of Israel or the ‘Wittena
Gemot’, the civil government of the Saxons — and king and the two houses of
Parliament on the other.89 To Lawson, this type of constitutional arrangement
is as necessary to the preservation of the church as it is to the state. For ‘if the
church once make any party the primary subject of this power, then they can-
not use it to reduce them’.90 That is, if any part of the church, for instance, the
bishops, be vested with absolute sovereignty, then the other parts cannot check
their exorbitances. Dividing the power of governing the church between dif-
ferent authorities is the only way to ensure that no authority may become
absolute and tyrannize over the community as a whole.
All of the civil constitutional forms that Lawson defends are found to have
their origin in the historical English community, and even the ecclesiastical
constitution is seen as one peculiarly suitable to the English national charac-
ter. This points to another crucial difference between Lawson and Locke, or at
least Franklin’s interpretation of Locke. Although Lawson considers the
nation to have a right to make and remake its government, he does not recom-
mend that the English nation seek constitutional innovation. For Lawson it
was precisely innovation that led to the Civil War, and the troubles of the
interregnum. James and Charles had been wrong to alter the doctrine and dis-
cipline of the national church, not only because the alterations introduced by
85 Politica, pp. 167, 175.
86 Ibid., p. 138.
87 Ibid., pp. 146–7.
88 Ibid., p. 134.
89 Ibid., p. 210. On the respective powers of the church government in episcopacy,
presbytery and people, and the civil government in king and parliament concerning reli-
gion, see ibid., p. 133.
90 Ibid., p. 175.
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King and bishops were ‘abuses, innovation, superstitions’, as some adjudged
them to be, but also because the alterations were imposed ‘without law and
authority of parliament’.91 Just as the innovations in the church were illegal,
so were the forced loans and other alleged sovereign acts of those kings in
civil government that bypassed parliament. After King Charles had been
deposed, parliament, and later Cromwell, introduced other innovations in
church and state. In Lawson’s words ‘to pull down one arbitrary power to
erect another . . . to erect new models of their own brain can be no act of fidel-
ity’.92 Indeed, none of the three new constitutional models attempted by par-
liament during the interregnum were able to acquire legitimacy in the eyes of
the nation.
A lasting settlement of the nation would require two things. First, the peo-
ple of England must remember that they are a nation, and that they thus owe
their first loyalty to the nation as a whole, and not to a faction, for ‘without
unity of the whole, or at least of the major part, the business will hardly be
effected’. Second, ‘the foundation to be laid is to find out the ancient constitu-
tion before it was corrupted too much, and understand the great wisdom of our
ancestors, gained by long experience in the constitution of our state’. This
‘finding out’ of the authentic ancient constitution of the realm would be the
work of ‘experienced statesmen, and antiquaries in law’. In Lawson’s view,
then, the foundations of a settlement for a nation accustomed to constitutional
self-government are united popular will and the accumulated wisdom of
ancestors. The ancient constitution would not only be the most efficacious in
its operation, once recovered, but it would also have more authority. A new
constitution constructed out of whole cloth on the basis of the judgments of
the present generation will not have as much legitimacy, will not elicit neces-
sary feelings of loyalty. If those charged with ruling the kingdom are not
anchored by an authoritative constitutional tradition, they will ‘spend their
time of every several parliament in moulding their government anew’.93
Franklin sees Lawson granting to representatives of the counties of Eng-
land a right to remodel the constitution in a national convention and presents
this account as a precursor to the Lockean theory, which permits a convention
parliament representing the whole people to ‘new-model’ the constitution
however it pleases.94 He acknowledges, however, that this sort of constitu-
tional convention most likely would have been a bridge too far for Lawson.
My point is that here, once again, Lawson’s argument makes more sense, and
is closer to historical reality, than that of Locke. Acts of popular sovereignty
482 E. ALEXANDER-DAVEY
91 Ibid., p. 258.
92 Ibid., p. 121.
93 Ibid., p. 123. In the last quotation in the paragraph, Lawson has in mind the recent
experience of the Commonwealth and Protectorate parliaments, all of which insisted on
remodelling the constitution in one way or another.
94 Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty, pp. 74–5, 121.
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need a firm grounding in the particular historical experience of a nation.95
This is confirmed by Lawson’s understanding of the problem of achieving a
constitutional settlement for England. What is important for the legitimacy of
a constitutional settlement is not merely that it be made by a convention par-
liament representing the whole nation, rather than an ordinary parliament.
The sanction of the ‘real majesty’ of the people represented in one convention
at one moment in time is not by itself a sufficient source of legitimacy for a
constitutional order. The wisdom of ancestors, the old laws, the old forms,
these are no less important, perhaps more so, for legitimacy. As far as Lawson
was concerned, a convention parliament would be duty bound to study the
ancient constitution with the help of ‘antiquaries in law’, and ground their
formulations firmly in the national tradition. Indeed, he warned against the
‘vain and presumptuous’ conceit that the present generation, without under-
standing ‘the great wisdom of our ancestors, gained by long experience in the
constitution of this our state,’ might be clever enough to produce something
better.96 One might say that, from his point of view, not only the consent of the
present generation, but also the consent of ancestors would be required for a
lasting settlement.97 Indeed, one finds that it was in this spirit that the English
people received Charles II at the Restoration, and rejected James II in favour
of William of Orange in 1689.98
Conclusion
The works of George Lawson provide a powerful illustration of the relation-
ship between popular sovereignty, constitutionalism and nationalism. Popu-
lar sovereignty requires a pre-political community, which, if it is to have real
substance, must be identified with concrete memories of the nation. Other-
wise, one is left with the formlessness and anarchy of Lockean volitional
associations. Locke himself understood that members of a pre-political com-
munity must have some special sources of mutual trust and friendship. But he
95 Even according to Renan, it is not just the ‘daily plebiscite’ that holds a nation
together, but also ‘the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories. See Yack,
‘The Myth of the Civic Nation’, p. 198.
96 Politica, p. 123.
97 Cf. Edmund Burke, who wrote a century and a half later that in all acts of govern-
ment, ‘the temporary possessors and life-renters . . . [of a commonwealth must not],
unmindful of what they have received from their ancestors, or what is due to their poster-
ity . . . act as though they were the entire masters’, and described the social contract as a
‘partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living,
those who are dead, and those who are to be born’ (Select Works of Edmund Burke: A
New Imprint of the Payne Edition, Vol. 2, ed. E.J. Payne (Indianapolis, 1999), pp. 191,
193).
98 Lawson’s Politica ‘displays those attitudes which facilitated the traumatic but rel-
atively bloodless shifts from Commonwealth to Stuart Restoration and to Williamite
regime’ (Condren, Lawson’s Politica, p. 37).
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was unable or unwilling to say what those sources were. George Lawson iden-
tified the pre-political community squarely with the nation, whose members
were bound together by affective ties based on a recognition of common
ancestry, language, religion and custom. The constitutional principles Law-
son defended were also derived from English historical memory and the
sacred history of the church. In his account, the national community and the
civil constitution acquire a ‘sacral’ character, just as the community of
Protestant believers and the ecclesiastical constitution take on the ‘organical’
character of the national historical community. Lawson is a particularly
striking example of those seventeenth-century proponents of constitutional
self-government who responded to the Hobbesian claim that a pre-political
community could not exist by injecting concrete and evocative nationalist
content into that notion of the pre-political community. Thus, it may be said
that Lawson successfully answers Hobbes, and plugs the holes in Locke’s theory.
If George Lawson and twenty-first century liberal nationalists are right, then
constitutional self-government depends on a common national cultural legacy
both for solidarity among its citizens and attachment to a particular constitu-
tional discipline. The attempt to purify the nation of these particularistic
attachments risks weakening the bonds of citizenship and the constitutional
order.
It is noteworthy, moreover, that Hobbes and twentieth-century liberals and
post-nationalists are alike in their fear of the evocative power of nationalism.
In the concluding pages of Leviathan, Hobbes attempts to dissuade others from
making evocative appeals to history. That all but a very few political writers
and actors in England completely ignored Hobbes and went on appealing, as
Lawson did, to England’s special inheritance of liberty and to the memory of
heroic ancestors who had shed their blood to preserve that inheritance, speaks
volumes. If one likes the result — constitutional self-government — then one
should be glad that Englishmen and political writers of other nations were not
afraid to use the emotive power of nationalism to this end. Those of the
Rawslian and Habermasian schools would like political discourse in liberal
democracies to be framed solely in terms of principles and reasons that can be
justified from the standpoint of all human beings. But this is an unrealistic
expectation. It seems a near certainty in any event that, the prescriptions of liberal
political philosophers notwithstanding, in competitive democratic politics,
politicians and political writers of all ideological stripes will go on using the
evocative power of nationalism whenever it suits them. Those who defend
constitutional democracy would be very unwise to opt out of this game.
Ethan Alexander-Davey WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS
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